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Grounding the International Norm on Women, Peace and 
Security: 
The Role of Domestic Norm Entrepreneurs and the Challenges Ahead
LOURDES VENERACION-RALLONZA
One of the gaps in the study of international norms is the process by which they are 
institutionalized and accepted at the national level. As the international norm nego-
tiates its way through various national (and even grassroots) levels, a point of in-
quiry would be how domestic norm entrepreneurs have enabled its localization. This 
study looks at the narrative of a loose network of peace and women’s human rights 
groups that worked together to localize United Nations Security Council Resolution 
(UNSCR) 1325 on women, peace and security in the Philippines. Specifically, it 
reviews how the network evolved to become a domestic norm entrepreneur within 
the context of the creation of the Philippine National Action Plan on the implemen-
tation of UNSCR 1325 and the initiatives it took to localize the norm in the national 
arena. Within this frame, this study argues that the network continues to evolve as 
it responds to current and unfolding realities of peace and women’s human rights 
in armed conflict situations. Particularly, as domestic norm entrepreneur, the net-
work is trying to transcend the usual top-down strategy of grounding an international 
norm and is now shifting gears toward the value of bottom-up approaches in order to 
achieve desired results at the grassroots level. 
Understanding International Norms
Constructivist literature on international norms highlights the role of norm entre-
preneurs in the construction of new norms or reconstruction of existing ones. Norm 
entrepreneurs, as Sunstein (1996, 903,929) describes, are actors who can alert people 
to the existence of a shared complaint and can suggest a collective solution by (a) 
signaling their own commitment to change; (b) creating coalitions; (c) making defi-
ance of a norm seem less costly; and (d) making compliance with new norms seem 
beneficial.
Norm entrepreneurs are said to impact on international political life when they are 
able to push their ideas in international negotiation fora (Ikenberry/Kupchan 1993) 
or are able to make state actors (including their own governments) accept internatio-
nal agreements that may not necessarily be part of the original state interest (Sikkink 
1993). This is to say that there is a strong link between the norm entrepreneur and the 
broader normative climate (Florini 1996, 386). At the same time, states need non-
state actors in the development of norms because they provide the necessary exper-
tise as well as render legitimacy to the norm (Stienstra 1999, 268). Non-state actors 
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welcome the opportunity to participate in the process of norm creation because it 
gives them the chance to influence political discourses on the issue and impact on the 
actual development of norms. This is the essence of collaborative politics – the stra-
tegic inter-action between state and non-state actors on specific political projects.1
Reminiscent of Putnam’s (1988) two-level games, Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, 
893) recognize the interaction between domestic and international realms as a two-
level norm game. According to this idea, international politics is a two-way street 
– domestic politics can shape international norms and international norms can bear 
upon domestic politics. In the latter, international norms have to negotiate their way 
through domestic institutions and institutionalized domestic politics. Negotiating 
through domestic spaces would be possible if enabling mechanisms such as policies 
and laws are established. For Risse et al. (1999) and Risse-Kappen (1996), this can 
lead us to understand important variations in compliance and interpretation of inter-
national norms at the domestic level. On a similar track of international-domestic 
interface, Acharya sees the process of international norm localization as 
the active construction (through discourse, framing, grafting, and cultural selection) of fo-
reign ideas by local actors, which results in the former developing significant congruence 
with local beliefs and practices (2004, 245).
For Acharya (2004, 247-248), the five key ingredients in international norm localiza-
tion are: a positive impact on legitimacy and authority of key norm-takers; strength 
of prior local norms; indigenous cultural traits and traditions; credibility and prestige 
of local agents; and scope for accepting and refining foreign norms according to 
domestic contexts. Operationally, variations on the domestic acceptance of internati-
onal norms depend on how it would positively accrue to the legitimacy and authority 
of a state’s existing regime, on how it converges with or diverges from pre-existing 
local norms, on how it would affect the prestige of domestic agents, on how it fits or 
falls outside of cultural traits and traditions, and how the phase and scope of norm 
transplantation would be accommodated within the domestic state system. On the 
other hand, Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) talk about international norm interna-
lization or the process by which the norm becomes embedded in the target actors’ 
psyche and has attained a status of being the new and unquestioned standard of 
action. According to them, the last stage of the norm life cycle is reached when the 
norm acquires a “taken-for-granted quality and no longer a matter of public debate” 
(Finnemore/Sikkink 1998, 895). 
From the context of an international norm grounding itself in the domestic sphere, 
this study provides empirical data on how domestic norm entrepreneurs in the Philip-
pines were able to advance the norm on women, peace and security as enshrined in 
the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 
in the country; additionally, it examines the impact of initial initiatives on the lives of 
women from conflict-affected areas as well as in the space for women’s participation 
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in peace processes. From the empirical data (documents and narratives) gathered, the 
study brings to light two emerging necessities: first, that for an international norm to 
be relevant, it must move from the project of localization to that of internalization; 
and second that for domestic norm entrepreneurs to make a genuine change in the 
lives of people from conflict affected areas, they must also put premium on the bot-
tom-up approach and have grassroots people participate in the process of “fleshing” 
out the norm. These emergent necessities contribute to understanding two realities: 
first, the concept of international norm internalization discussed by Finnemore and 
Sikkink as the last stage of the norm life cycle is exemplified through the Philippine 
case of implementing UNSCR 1325; and second, domestic norm entrepreneurship 
(particularly that by embedded actors in social movements in the country) is further 
nuanced by critically examining how norm entrepreneurs fare in impacting changes 
on the ground. On both counts, the narrative of women’s activism on women, peace 
and security in the Philippines is brought to light.
The International Norm on Women, Peace and Security (WPS)
In times of war and armed conflict situations, civilian populations or unarmed groups 
are the ones most affected. Women, as part of the civilian population, become vic-
tims of violence much the same way as men. However, as women, they are primarily 
targeted because of their gender and thus, they suffer comparatively more than the 
men. Gender-based violence in the context of war deploys rape as a weapon of war, 
uses sexual assault and slavery as a form of torture, and systematically increases the 
vulnerability of women in order to undermine the gender-biased cultural construc-
tion of the community or society (Kesic 2001; Morris 2000; MacKinnon 1994).
The international community, although definitely lethargic in recognizing the plight 
of women during wartime, nonetheless (thankfully) began talking about this issue 
as contained in the declaration of the 1993 Vienna Conference on Human Rights, in 
the provisions of the 1995 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, and in the 
1996, 1998 and 2000 reports of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Hu-
man Rights on Violence against Women, Its Causes and Consequences. Responding 
to the need to correct the historical inadequacy of international legal instruments to 
protect women in conflict situations, the International Criminal Court (ICC) – which 
came into force in July 2000 – finally codified violence against women (VAW), 
speci fically rape and sexual violence, as war crime, crime against humanity, and 
crime constitutive of genocide (Copelon 2000). Supposedly, this stage of institutio-
nalization will end the culture of impunity for gender-based crimes against women 
during situations of armed conflict. In October of the same year, the UN Security 
Council (UNSC) unanimously adopted Resolution 1325 which specifically acknow-
ledged that the maintenance of international peace and security must involve the pro-
tection of women and must include them in post-conflict reconstruction and peace 
processes. UNSCR 1325 came to be known as the codified international norm on 
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‘Women, Peace and Security’ (WPS). What this particular development implies, in 
general, is that women’s security has become part of the broader security discourse 
at the international level (Hamber et al. 2006, 490). 
The Resolution 1325 emphasized “the responsibility of all States to put an end to 
impunity and to prosecute those responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity, 
and war crimes including those relating to sexual and other violence against women 
and girls” and stressed “the need to exclude these crimes, where feasible from am-
nesty provisions” (Operative Clause 11). In a nutshell, within the framework of Ar-
ticle 25 of the UN Charter2, UNSCR 1325 obligates states to protect and respect the 
human rights of women and girls, open opportunities and guarantee the participa-
tion of women in all levels of decision-making; and provide for gender perspectives 
in peace processes. The UN, on the other hand, is obligated to mainstream gender 
in Secretary General and Security Missions and explicitly recognizes the need for 
gender mainstreaming in peacekeeping work (Hudson 2005). Thereafter, two other 
resolutions were passed by the UNSC to add force to UNSCRs 1325 and 1820. UN-
SCR 1888 was adopted in September 2009 calling for a Special Representative to the 
Secretary-General on ending sexual violence in conflict. UNSCR 1889 was adopted 
in the same year calling for a range of measures to strengthen the participation of 
women in all phases of peace processes. 
Taking all these progressive developments together, one must not forget the role of 
various international women’s groups and transnational feminist networks that wor-
ked hard to place the realities of women in the discourse of peace and security (Hill et 
al. 2003). The challenge is to ensure that the discourse will be translated into practice.
The Philippine Armed Conflict Context and the Protection of Women in 
Armed Conflict Situations
The on-going armed conflicts in the Philippines have been rooted in the country’s 
colonial past as well as in its reality of continued disenfranchisement of peoples. 
Conflicts with two distinct armed groups have been part of the country’s contem-
porary political history: the communist and Muslim insurgency movements.
The communist insurgency, embodying a national-democratic revolutionary 
struggle, emerged in the 1930s with the establishment of the Partido Komunista 
Pilipino (PKP). After the Second World War, PKP integrated with Hukbo ng Bayan 
Laban sa Hapon (Hukbalahap), a grassroots people’s movement that fought against 
the Japanese. Two decades later, the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) was 
established in 1968 followed by its armed group, the New Peoples Army (NPA) in 
1969. In over 40 years, the communist struggle seeking to establish an egalitarian 
society through a protracted people’s warfare against imperialist and reactionary 
forces/actors continues despite attempts to bring parties of the conflict to the nego-
tiation table. Currently, the ideological underpinning of the struggle has been fused 
with specific contexts of indigenous peoples’ rights, agrarian reform, oppression of 
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political authorities and their hired militias, and resource-based claims such as mi-
ning and corporate wealth. According to the International Crisis Group (2010), the 
communist insurgents have strongholds in Central and Northern Luzon, the CALA-
BARZON (Cavite, Laguna, Batangas, Rizal, and Quezon), Bicol, Eastern Visayas, 
Negros Occidental, and Eastern and Southern Mindanao (the Caraga, Compostela 
Valley, and Davao).
The armed conflict in Muslim Mindanao, on the other hand, can be traced from the 
historic struggle of self-determination and nationhood of the Moros. Prior to the 
colonial period in the country, the process of Islamization had already taken its roots 
in the south, particularly in the sultanates of Maguindanao and Sulu. Combining this 
politico-religious process with the failed political project of conquest by the Span-
iards and the Americans in the area, the people in the south, heterogeneous as they 
were (Moros3, Lumads4), developed their own consciousness as a “nation”. Thus, the 
armed conflict frame that emerged was that of the people defending their homeland 
and the Philippine state (as a legacy of its colonial “upbringing”) defending its ter-
ritorial integrity (Santos 2006) – a classic clash of “imagined communities”.5 In ad-
dition, the continuing struggle of the Moros has also been a response to the sustained 
disenfranchisement of their people as a result of strategic/systematic migration of 
non-Muslims (from Luzon and the Visayas) that removed them from their lands. 
The Moros also fall victim to collective discrimination and exploitative extraction of 
their resources without leaving them any sustainable livelihood benefits. Two groups 
emerged which advanced the Bangsamoro6 struggle, namely, the Muslim National 
Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Muslim Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).
Efforts have been enhanced in order to end four decades of internal civil conflict in 
the Philippines. On the side of ending communist insurgency, the Philippine Govern-
ment opened peace talks with the CPP-NPA-NDF and managed to sign the Compre-
hensive Agreement on the Respect for Human Rights and International Humanita-
rian Law (CARHRIHL) in 1998. This was the first substantive agreement signed 
between the communist insurgents and the government. But subsequent negotiations 
were stalled and by April 2013 officially suspended. As for the Moro insurgency, the 
Philippine Government negotiated with the MNLF and MILF separately. During the 
term of President Fidel V. Ramos, the Government and the MNLF signed the Final 
Peace Agreement in 1996 and in accordance with the autonomy provision in the 
1987 Philippine Constitution, Congress passed the 1989 Republic Act (RA) 6734 
for the creation of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao. In the case of the 
MILF, the Government signed with them the Framework Agreement on the Bang-
samoro (FAB) last October 2012. For both agreements, implementation and moving 
forward to attain genuine peace are still wanting.
During the same decade that armed struggle began in different parts of the country, 
the dictatorship period in the Philippines in the 1970s gave rise to a social move-
ment that fought to end authoritarian rule in the country. Women were part of the 
movement – mostly integrated into the nationalist democratic struggle. According 
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to Roces (2000, 122), the focus on the national democratic struggle tended to un-
dermine women’s concerns in a way that they were seen to be not priority issues in 
the fight for “social injustice, dictatorship, class struggle, democracy, violence and 
revolution”. However, this marginalization within the movement itself did not deter 
the women’s movement to come into being on its own. The late 1970s leading up to 
the People Power Revolution in 1986 saw the vibrancy and strength of the move-
ment – fighting against human rights violations as well as worsening social and eco-
nomic disenfranchisement, advancing the rights of women workers as well as mak-
ing women’s concerns visible through media, and moving towards collectivizing the 
strength of women in the political sphere (Veneracion-Rallonza 2008, 221).7 This is 
not to say, however, that the women’s movement in the country advanced in a singu-
lar path; additionally, the narrative of contentious politics was not a monolithic one. 
As Francisco (1998, 13) explains, women’s groups in the Philippines were either 
socio-civic oriented or activist oriented: the former concentrated more on assisting 
women through issue-specific programs while the latter focused more on protests, 
lobbying and other forms of contention strategies. 
To a large extent, the women’s movement concentrated on women’s human rights 
while women in peace movements advanced the project of peace and espoused for 
non-violent social change. Each had its framework of analysis and political agenda – 
but only the women’s movement had a distinct gender advocacy and feminist frame. 
Gender analysis was a natural discourse for the women’s movement but was mostly 
applied to advancing the cause of violence against women (VAW); on the other hand, 
the women in peace movements did not consciously apply a gender analysis in their 
call for the end of conflict and creation of a culture of peace. 
In terms of the institutionalization of their advocacies, the women’s movement be-
came more prominent. For example, by the 1990s, the vibrant and dynamic women’s 
movement in the country paved the way for the passage of several laws on women’s 
human rights: (1) Women in Development and Nation-building (RA 7192); (2) The 
Philippine Plan for Gender-Responsive Development (PPGD) 1995-2025; (3) Anti-
Rape Act of 1997 (RA 8353); and the (4) Rape Victim Assistance and Protection Act 
of 1998 (RA 8505). The following decade, the women’s movement was also instru-
mental in the passage of the Anti-trafficking in Persons Act of 2003 (RA 9208), Anti-
Violence against Women and their Children Act of 2004 (RA 9262), the Magna Carta 
of Women in the Philippines (RA 7190) in 2009, and the Responsible Parenthood 
and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RA 10354). Interestingly, of all these progres-
sive women’s human rights laws, only RA 7190 specifically provided for the pro-
tection women from gender-based violence in situations of armed conflicts and their 
participation in peace-building processes. Not even the Philippine Act on Crimes 
Against International Law, Genocide, and Other Crimes Against Humanity of 2010 
(RA 9851) was explicit about women’s protection and prevention of crimes against 
them during armed conflict. It is in this regard that the political opportunity structure 
enabled the peace and the women’s human rights movements to come together.
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Localizing UNSCR 1325 and the Role of Peace and Women’s Groups
On 15 September 1993, the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process 
(OPAPP) was created by virtue of Executive Order (EO) 125. Additionally, the Na-
tional Unification Commission (NUC) was also established and it identified the key 
strategies to a comprehensive peace process:
implementation of reforms; consensus-building and empowerment for peace; negotiated 
settlement with rebel groups; rehabilitation and reintegration of former rebels into society; 
addressing immediate concerns in areas affected by hostilities; and building and nurturing 
a climate conducive to peace. (WE Act 1325 2011, 24). 
An Executive Order enacted in 2001 reaffirmed these strategies for peace. Three ye-
ars later, the National Peace Plan (NPP) was adopted with the goal to end hostilities 
between the government and armed insurgents, focus on enhancing human security 
in conflict-affected areas, expand the constituency of the peace process to include 
citizen participation, and enhance the policy environment to promote spaces condu-
cive to human security and peace. These efforts, however, did not fully acknowledge 
the gendered face of war or the gender dimension of peace – both of which have been 
the contextual frames of UNSCRs 1325 and 1820 – and for all intents and purposes, 
they were gender-blind.
Conception, Actors and Process of Crafting the National Action Plan
In 2007, three women – namely, Jasmin Nario-Galace, Mavic Cabrera-Belleza 
and Miriam Coronel Ferrer of the Center for Peace Education (CPE), International 
Women’s Tribune Center (IWTC) and Sulong (Advance) CARHRIHL – just happe-
ned to see each other at Miriam College. In this rather incidental meeting, they got 
to talk about UNSCR 1325 and came to realize that there was absolutely no action 
in the Philippines about the seven year old Security Council resolution. Right there 
and then, they decided to spearhead efforts to raise awareness on UNSCR 1325. At 
this very moment, the space for the peace, women and human rights movements to 
converge on a collective project emerged – these movements organically and stra-
tegically coalesced to become domestic norm entrepreneurs of women, peace and 
security.8 Individually, Nario-Galace has been known in national and international 
circles for her peace advocacy and anti-small arms campaign, particularly, in the 
International Action Network Against Small Arms (IANSA) Women’s Network; 
Coronel-Ferrer, a university professor heavily involved in research and advocacy 
on human rights and peace, including her current role as the Chair of the Philippine 
Government peace panel in the negotiation with the MILF; and Cabrera-Belleza, 
a veteran women’s movement activist both locally and internationally who is now 
working for the Global Network of Women Peacebuilders (GNWP) in New York. 
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By December 2007, the process on UNSCR 1325 began with an initial consultation 
workshop for government agencies and civil society organizations organized by 
these women and their respective groups along with the Philippine Commission 
on Women (PCW). The following year, they concentrated their efforts on lobbying 
the OPAPP to lead the government’s creation of a national action plan on UNSCR 
1325.
In March 2009, CPE, IWTC, Sulong CARHRIHL and OPPAP created a Prepara-
tory Committee (PrepCom) to prepare, organize and facilitate multi-stakeholders 
and regional consultations to craft a national action plan and its implementing strat-
egies. To assist in the organization of regional consultations, other groups were 
brought into the PrepCom: for Luzon, it was the Concerned Citizens of Abra for 
Good Government (CCAGG), an NGO that advocates for peace and justice through 
good governance; for Visayas, Paghiliusa sa Paghidaet-Negros (PsPN), a citizens’ 
action group involved in peace-building work in Negros Occidental; and for Min-
danao, the Initiatives for International Dialogue (IID), another peace-building civil 
society organization. Another peace organization – namely, the Gaston Z. Ortigas 
(GZO) Peace Institute – joined the PrepCom as well as several women’s human 
rights groups such as Women and Gender Institute (WAGI),9 Mindanao Commission 
on Women (MCW),10 and Lupasug Bangsa Moro Women Association, Inc.11 Of all 
the groups that eventually comprised the PrepCom, only IID and WAGI had prior 
initiatives in popularizing UNSCR 1325 in the context of armed conflicts.
The women who are instrumental actors within their organization are well known 
in their respective movement circles. For example, Paz Bumogas of CCAGG, is a 
prominent woman leader and advocate of indigenous peoples rights; Sister Arnold 
Noel of Sulong CARHRIHL is a Servants of the Holy Spirits (SSps) nun and has 
been a lead figure in the convening of various peace and human rights groups in the 
country; Delia Locsin of PsPN is well known in Negros Occidental for her decades-
long humanitarian and community development work primarily in the province’s 
armed conflict-affected areas; Carmen Lauzon-Gatmaytan of IID leads her orga-
nization’s initiatives on women and peacebuilding; GZO is led by Karen Tanada, 
daughter of an anti-Martial Law and democracy icon in the Philippines and is her-
self a major figure in the country’s peace movement; Irene Santiago of MCW and 
convener of the group Mothers for Peace is one of the main movers of women’s 
human rights in the country and served as the Philippine government peace panel 
negotiator with the MILF from 2001 to 2004; Aurora Javate-De Dios of WAGI is not 
only known in the Philippines as a leading women’s human rights defender but also 
internationally because of her work as the Special Rapporteur in the Committee on 
the Status of Women in the UN among others; and Fatimah Salapudin of Lupasug 
Bangsa Moro Women Association Inc. is a prime mover of Muslim women’s peace 
and development concerns in Southern Philippines.12 These women, through their 
organizations and various involvements in peace and women’s human rights issues, 
were also instrumental in lobbying for national legislations and policies. 
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Reflective of civil society engagements with the state, peace and women’s groups 
have been active in advancing their advocacies and campaigns and having them 
translated into laws.13 Since the 1986 People Power Revolution that overthrew an 
authoritarian regime, civil society groups have been constructively engaging the 
state to advance their political projects – on the one hand, they were still critical 
of the state; on the other hand, they also acknowledged the need to work with the 
state through legislative and collaborative politics. More recently, the latter has been 
prominent as indicated by women movement leaders serving in government posi-
tions, an example of which is Teresita Deles, another prominent women’s movement 
icon and peace-builder, who now serves as the head of OPAPP. In the early 1980s, 
Secretary Deles helped establish PILIPINA, one of the first women’s groups that 
distinctively carried a feminist line as well as Abanse Pinay, a women’s party that 
participated in the first party-list elections in 1998. Additionally, the party was also a 
co-founder of the Coalition for Peace and served as the Executive Director of GZO. 
Internationally, Secretary Deles was elected as an expert-member in UN Committee 
on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women. 
Part of the process of collaborative politics is that of consultative and participa-
tory practices that involved the cooperation between government and civil society 
actors. This paradigm was followed in the crafting of the national action plan on 
UNSCR 1325. The PrepCom thus organized several regional consultations in 2009 
that were meant to map out the general situation of women, peace and security, 
women’s peace-building initiatives, and recommendations on matters that should be 
included in a national action plan. For this purpose, the PrepCom prepared a working 
document that was used during the six regional cluster multi-stakeholders’ consulta-
tions. These consultations targeted the participation of frontline peace and security 
government agencies such as the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), Philippine 
National Police (PNP), Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), De-
partment of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), National Commission on 
Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), OPAPP, PCW, National Economic and Development 
Authority (NEDA), National Anti-Poverty Commission (NAPC), Office of Muslim 
Affairs (OMA), and the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) as well as peace and 
women’s human rights NGOs. 
A total of six regional cluster meetings were held beginning August 2009. After these 
consultations a consolidated draft national action plan was formulated and submit-
ted to a national validation workshop for civil society organizations organized by 
the IWTC, held on 19 October 2009. A similar national validation workshop was 
held for government agencies on 26 October 2009. The resulting inputs from these 
national validation workshops were integrated in the draft national action plan and 
the preliminary text which was sent back to consultation and validation workshop 
participants for additional suggestions/recommendations. The resulting text, which 
would be the content of the country’s national action plan on UNSCR 1325, was thus 
a product of collaborative politics. The regional consultations served as the space 
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to institutionalize women, peace and security. Procedurally, it weaved the various 
priority areas of women’s concerns in armed conflict and peace-building from the 
perspective of both government and civil society; substantively, the language of the 
action plan was drawn from the voices of the participants. The creation of the na-
tional action plan on UNSCR 1325 was unprecedented in so far as government-civil 
society collaboration and consultative processes are concerned. Both instances are 
a far cry from contentious politics and protest strategies usually attributed to the 
women’s movement. What emerged was a form of dialogic politics that integrated 
the voices of those who were part of the consultation processes.
As the PrepCom worked on the final draft at the end of the consultation process, 
then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo created the National Steering Committee 
on Women, Peace and Security (NSCWPS) in 2010 to institutionalize WPS through 
the implementation of a national action plan in the country. The respective Execu-
tive Order 865 is formally entitled “Creation of a National Steering Committee on 
Women, Peace and Security to Implement the UN Security Council Resolutions 
1325 and 1820 and Providing Funds Thereof”. Organizationally, the NSCWPS is 
headed by the OPPAP chair and is assisted by the chair of the PCW as co-chair. 
Members of the NSCWPS include the Secretaries of the Department of National 
Defense (DND), Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), Depart-
ment of Justice (DOJ), Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) and 
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) as well as the chair of the National Commis-
sion on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) and the head of the Office on Muslim Affairs 
(OMA). Operationally, it is mandated to “provide over-all policy direction, as well 
as manage, coordinate, monitor, evaluate and report on the implementation of the 
NAP and tap domestic and international donor agencies and NGOs for technical 
assistance and financial support” (WE Act 1325 2011, 26-27).
Women Engaged in Action on UNSCR 1325
Towards the tail end of Women’s Month of 2010, the Philippine National Action Plan 
(NAP) on 1325 was launched at Miriam College on 25 March. During this year, 26 
countries had their own national action plans and the Philippines was the first one 
to launch in the whole of Asia.14 By November 2010, OPAPP enhanced the action 
plan indicators to make them bases for concrete targets for the next five years (We 
Act 1325 2011, 25). The finalized PNAP has four pillars – namely, protection and 
prevention, empowerment and participation, promotion and mainstreaming, and ca-
pacity development and monitoring/reporting. It contains fourteen action points that 
respond to key commitments under UNSCR 1325 framework. 
Complementing the launch of the NAP in March 2010, the Women Engaged in Ac-
tion (WE Act) on 1325 was established on 17 March 2010 as a loose national net-
work of civil society groups working on peace and women’s rights.15 Of the 29 or-
ganizational members, 14 are largely peace NGOs, twelve are women’s groups and 
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three are human rights and atrocities prevention organizations. Boxes 1-3 show the 
categories of these groups.
Additionally, four organizations that participated in the regional workshops also be-
came founding members of the network.16 Most of these organizations were also 
present during the National Validation Workshop on the Philippine National Action 
Plan on UNSCR 1325 held on 19 October 2009. To date, the network has maintained 
its loosely-structured character: it does not have a formal organizational structure 
in order to move away from hierarchization (which is a distinctive feminist organi-
zational principle) but has several focal points to serve as communication conduits 
for the network members. These focal points are: CPE and Sulong CARHRIHL as 
national focal points while the regional focal points are AKKAPKA for Luzon, PsPN 
for the Visayas and MCW for Mindanao.
Boxes 1-3. Categories of Groups within the WE Act 1325 Network
In reviewing the background and work of these organizations, it can be inferred 
that the scope of their work is from the grassroots all the way to the national level 
(some even have international links). With regard to organizational strategies, these 
networks are heavily involved in advocacy work, education and training, commu-
nity-based involvement, networking, lobbying for legislation, research, and multi-
Box 1. PEACE GROUPS
1. Center for Peace Education (CPE)
2. Aksyon sa Kapayapaan at Katarungan (AK-
KAPKA) or Action for Peace and Justice
3. Balay Mindanaw Foundation, Inc. (BMFI)
4. Balay Rehabilitation Center, Inc.
5. Concerned Citizens of Abra for Good Go-
vernment (CCAGG)
6. The Conflict Resolution Group (The CoRe 
Group)
7. Gaston Z. Ortigas Peace Institute (GZO)
8. Generation Peace Youth Network (Gen-
Peace)
9. Initiative for International Dialogue (IID)
10. Kutawato Council for Justice and Peace, 
Inc. 
11. Mindanao Peoples Caucus (MPC)
12. Panaghiliusa sa Paghidaet-Negros (PsPN)
13. Philippine Action Network to Control Arms 
(PhilANCA)
14. St. Louis College of Bulanao (SLCB)-Cultu-
ral Heritage Center
Box 2. WOMEN’S GROUPS
1. Al-Mujahidah Development Foundation, 
Inc. (AMDF)
2. Asian Circle 1325
3. Isis International
4. Katungod Han Samarena Foundation, Inc.
5. Lupah Sug Bangsamoro Women’s Associ-
ation
6. Mindanao Commission on Women
7. Nisa Ul Haqq Bangsamoro, Inc.
8. Pilipina, Inc.
9. Pinay Kilos (PinK)
10. Saligan
11. Teduray Lambangian Women’s Organiza-
tion
12. Women and Gender Institute (WAGI)
Box 3. HUMAN RIGHTS AND ATROCITIES
   PREVENTION GROUPS
1. Sulong CARHRIHL
2. Asia-Pacific Centre on the Responsibility 
to Protect
3. Philippine Coalition for the International 
Criminal Court
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sectoral/actor dialogues. Many of them have also worked with government agencies 
such as the PCW, OPAPP and have been involved in training various state service 
providers. Additionally, there has been collaborative work between them in the areas 
of human rights advocacy, peace building and conflict resolution, and women’s hu-
man rights. In integrating the implementation of NAP in their work, much of their 
strategies involved education on UNSCR 1325 and other women’s human rights 
instruments as well as advocacy for women peace and security. Graph 1 compares 
the priority strategies of these groups as individual organizations and their strategies 
to advance the NAP.
Graph 1. Organization and NAP Strategies
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Network Initiatives
Individually, network members have programs on Women, Peace and Security 
(WPS); collectively, they advocate for the PNAP and monitor its implementation. 
Since its establishment, WE Act 1325 has been holding capacity-building and trai-
ners’ training for its members, UNSCRs 1325/1820 and PNAP seminar workshops 
for its various constituencies including local government partners and security sector 
actors deployed in the Philippines and abroad (for UN Peacekeeping Operations). It 
has also worked with some local government units for the legislation of local action 
plans (LAP), and has networked with regional and global civil society organizations 
on various WPS activities. According to the most recent report of We Act 1325, the 
strengths of the network are in the areas of “policy review; capability building and 
training of various stakeholders; engagement with negotiators of on-going peace 
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processes; advocacy to increase women’s participation in peacebuilding in national 
and local levels; peace education; and media campaigns” (WE Act 1325 2012, 1). 
Placing these identified strengths with the action points of the PNAP, it becomes evi-
dent that the network has placed tremendous effort and resources on specific actions 
points under pillar 1 (protection and prevention), centering on training and locali-
zation initiatives. As for individual members’ initiatives on advancing the NAP, the 
most prominent additional areas of focus are pillars 2 (empowerment and participa-
tion) and 3 (gender mainstreaming). Graph 2 illustrates the tabulation of both WE 
Act 1325 and individual members (WE Act 1325 2012, 7-58).
Graph 2. Network and Members’ NAP Initiatives
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Both collectively and individually, WE Act 1325 and its members are strong in edu-
cation/training strategies to promote UNSCR 1325 and other relevant mechanisms 
on women, peace and security. In this regard, their strength as domestic norm entre-
preneurs has been on championing WPS through knowledge-sharing and capability 
training. Currently, in the absence of any organized group to monitor WPS in the 
country, WE Act 1325 acts as the unofficial watchdog for the implementation of the 
NAP by the Philippine government. This is the case primarily because of the simple 
reason that the instrument mainly seeks to promote and embed WPS among state ac-
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tors. In terms of assessing the impact of the network on popularizing the NAP, WE 
Act has yet to embark on an evaluation research. However, as of this writing, they 
are involved in assessing the implementation of the NAP by government agencies.
Localization But Not (Yet) Internalization
In light of international politics, the international norm on WPS emerged in the 
discursive arena of the UN. As mentioned earlier, the significance of the UNSC to 
come out with a specific resolution on WPS reflected the acknowledgement that the 
specific concerns of women in armed conflict situations as well as in conflict reso-
lution, post-conflict reconstruction and peace-building are central to international 
peace and security. Since the adoption of UNSCR 1325, 41 countries have crafted 
their own national action plans. The Philippines, in 2010, was the first one in Asia 
to have done so.
The Philippine process of crafting the NAP was a product of two main components. 
First, the role of peace and women’s rights organizations as domestic norm entrepre-
neurs was vital to ensure that the effort would not fall into the tragedy of government 
rhetoric. Taking on the call of the government to assist in mapping out a national 
situation on women, popularization of UNSCR 1325 to various constituencies, and 
consultations with multi-stakeholders on the content of the envisioned national ac-
tion plan, these groups consolidated their efforts to realize these goals. The regional 
cluster consultations and the feedback mechanisms that ensued gave the whole pro-
cess credibility and legitimacy. Second, the support provided by the Philippine gov-
ernment through OPPAP and the willingness of the civil society groups to work with 
them on the WPS political project was a clear indication of collaborative politics 
between state and non-state actors at the national level. In this light, it has become 
evident that working for peace is neither the monopoly of the government nor civil 
society but a political project of both. At the same time, collaborative politics was 
also evident in how the network evolved by having two distinct social movement 
groups – peace and women’s human rights – converged in advancing the protection 
of women in armed conflict situations as well as ensuring a space for them to par-
ticipate in various peace-building mechanisms and processes. Their discursive frame 
was clear – that of placing women in the country’s peace and security discourse and 
practice.
The Philippines have been known to have several laws on women’s human rights. 
These women-centered laws reflect the country’s commitment to its international 
commitments, particularly, CEDAW and its Optional Protocol as well as other con-
sensus instruments such as the Vienna Declaration on Human Rights and the Bei-
jing Declaration and Platform for Action. The operationalization of commitments 
through its national legal frame essentially means that women’s rights issues and 
concerns – particularly violence against women– have been institutionalized. This 
institutionalization paved the way for gender-consciousness to be part of the norma-
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tive mindset of key actors advancing changes in society. In this regard, the norma-
tive contextual milieu for the peace and women’s human rights groups to converge 
became possible. For example, in the process of crafting the NAP, they were seen 
as norm entrepreneurs that linked both national and local levels in the construction 
and (subsequent) implementation of the NAP. The presence of OPPAP as the institu-
tional actor backing up the process reflected a government committed to the plight 
of women in conflict situations and its obligation to include women in the process of 
securing peace. The creation of the NSCWPS was instrumental in sending the mes-
sage that the government, in collaboration with civil society actors, was serious in 
pursuing a gender-responsive peace process. Additionally, the presence of women in 
the government’s peace talks with the CPP-NPA-NDF and the MILF indicated that 
the government was conscious of their commitment to institutionalized norms. 
In terms of government panel membership in the last few years, women’s partici-
pation has been increasing, as well as in the support system (secretariat, legal staff 
etc). For example, the government panel in talks with the CPP-NPA-NDF have two 
women negotiators – namely, Jurgette Honculada and Lourdes Tison – and the secre-
tariat is also headed by a woman, Carla Villarta. The head of the government panel in 
the negotiations with the MILF is Miriam Coronel-Ferrer, from Sulong CARHRIHL 
and one of the conveners who organized for the NAP. Several members of the WE 
Act 1325 network also became part of this panel – Yasmin Busran-Lao as negotiator 
and Johaira Wahab as head of the government’s legal team – are members of Nisa-Ul 
Haq Bangsamoro Inc. along with Raisa Jajuri who is part of the MILF legal team. 
Additionally, Fatimah Salapudin of Lupah Sug Bangsamoro Women’s Association 
and Froilin Tenorio of Teduray Lambangian Women’s Organization are government 
representatives of Moro and indigenous groups respectively in the Transition Com-
mission to flesh out the details of the FAB. In a conversation with some of these 
women, the common thread that ran across their message was that WPS has been an 
integral part of their work in the peace process. In fact, the FAB is the very first peace 
agreement of the Philippines that explicitly mentions the word ‘gender’ and provides 
for the rights of Moro women.17
With regard to the text of the WPS action plan, it was evident that the essence of the 
NAP resonated with the key thematic areas of UNSCR 1325, particularly, protection, 
prevention and women’s participation. Owing to the gender-conscious mindset that 
resulted from the institutionalization of women’s human rights norms in the country, 
both civil society and government actors essentially spoke the same protective and 
empowerment language. Thus, not many contentious points were raised in the craft-
ing of the NAP.
Taking these points together, it can be said that the international norm on WPS was 
localized in the Philippine setting. However, it has yet to be internalized. For as 
Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) claim, internalization reflects a “taken-for-granted” 
or unquestioned status of the norm that would bring about significant changes in the 
behavior of actors. Operationalizing this in the Philippine case means that the protec-
FP_02_13_009_104.indd   81 08.10.2013   18:20:37
REFLEXIONEN ZU GENDER UND POLITISCHER PARTIZIPATION IN ASIEN
82 FEMINA POLITICA 2 | 2013
tion of women and girls in conflict situations, the participation of women in peace-
building efforts, and the gender-balance in all levels of decision-making have been 
realized. Unfortunately, this has not been the case. Women and girls continue to be 
the vulnerable sector of the civilian population in armed conflict situations. Whenever 
they are forced to evacuate their communities because of encounters between armed 
groups and temporarily seek shelters in evacuation areas, their burden of survival 
multiplies. At the same time, grassroots women in conflict-affected areas are deeply 
marginalized – they neither have the voice nor the opportunities to articulate their 
concerns. Although some may be “represented” by civil society groups or NGOs, 
their identified need is that of participation – unfortunately, gender dynamics in their 
community (and familial) contexts have prevented them to do so. There is no question 
that they want peace to be achieved – regardless whether they are included in the pro-
cess or not. What they are more concerned about is daily survival for them and their 
families. These are the realities on the ground and these are the voices from the bot-
tom that need to be brought up. Women from conflict-affected areas quite poignantly 
point out that it is good to know about UNSCR 1325 and the NAP but they do not 
seem to feel a lasting or sustainable impact on their lives. In their minds, it is impor-
tant for those who are on ”top” to take note of what their real needs are on the ground.
It is in light of these ground insights that WE Act 1325 is stepping up its work as 
WPS domestic norm entrepreneur. In addition to conducting trainings to various sec-
tors and stakeholders, they are now focusing their efforts on monitoring government 
responses in conflict-affected areas. This is a very important re-framing of their work 
particularly in the context of escalating violence in various parts of the country after 
the peace talks between the government and the CPP-NPA-NDF broke down as well 
as the military’s renewed pursuit of other armed groups such as the Bangsamoro Is-
lamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) in remote areas in southern Philippines. The network 
has realized that for WPS to resonate with its intended beneficiaries, the political 
project must move from localization to that of internalization of the norm.
Notes
1 This term was used by the author in an unpublished doctoral dissertation entitled “The Evolution of 
Norms in International Relations: A Study on the Development of the Norm Against Wartime Rape in the 
International Criminal Court”.
2 As stated in Article 25, Chapter V of the United Nations Charter, “The Members of the United Nations 
agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Char-
ter”.
3 The Moros are subdivided into Iranun/Ilanun/Ilanum, Jama Mapun, Kalagan, Kalibugan, Maguindanao, 
Maranao, Sama, Sangil, Tausug, Yakan.
4 The Lumads have been considered as the indigenous communities in Mindanao and historically have 
not been converted to Christianity or Islam. They are composed of 19 groups inhabiting 19 provinces in 
Mindanao.
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15 The term “imagined communities”, as coined by Benedict Anderson (1983), pertains to the social 
construction of a community as advanced by people to believe that they belong to a specific or distinct 
collective.
16 According to the 2012 Government of the Philippines (GPH) and Muslim Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) 
Framework Agreement, the Bangsamoro identity pertains to those “who at the time of conquest and 
colonization were considered natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago and 
its adjacent islands including Palawan, and their descendants whether of mixed or of full blood shall 
have the right to identify themselves as Bangsamoro by ascription or self-ascription”.
17 Some of these groups were: Association of Women in Theology, Kapisanan ng mga Madre sa Kamay-
nilaan (Organization of Nuns in Manila), Women in Media Now, Samahan ng mga Kababaihang Man-
ggagawa (Association of Women Workers), Samahan ng Malayang Kababaihan (Association of Free 
Women) and General Assembly Building Women for Reforms, Equality, Leadership and Action or GA-
BRIELA. 
18 Organizationally, CPE is a center focused on peace education and conflict resolution house in an acade-
mic institution while IWTC is an international non-governmental organization established after the 1976 
UN World Conference on Women in Mexico City and Sulong CARHRIHL is a third party citizens’ network 
that monitors compliance and non-compliance of CARHRIHL parties. 
19 WAGI is a training, research and advocacy institute for women’s human rights based at Miriam College. 
10 MCW is a group composed of Christian, Muslim and indigenous women leaders in Mindanao that seeks 
to influence policies, particularly in the areas of peace and development. 
11 Lupasug Bangsa Moro Women Association Inc. is a tri-people (Muslim, Christian and Lumad) women 
leaders group based in Mindanao that advances peace and development with a gender perspective.
12 As of this writing, Lauzon-Gatmaytan is a consultant for OPAPP; Javate-De Dios is a commissioner of 
the ASEAN Commission for Women and Children; and Salapudin is a member of the Transition Com-
mission on the FAB.
13 For example, the women’s movement did not waver in their resolve to have vital legislations to be 
passed: the Anti-Rape Law took five years to be legislated while the Anti-VAWC law took nine; the Re-
productive Health Law was thirteen years in the making.
14 As of this writing, there are 41 countries that have their own national action plans. See National Action 
Plan Implementation at http://www.peacewomen.org/naps/. 
15 See http://weact1325.org/ for additional information about these groups.
16 These were AKKAPKA, MPC, PCICC and Pilipina, Inc.
17 Part VI (Basic Rights) of the FAB provides for “(g) Right of women to meaningful political participation, 
and protection from all forms of violence;” and “(i) Right to equal opportunity and non-discrimination 
in social and economic activity and the public service, regardless of class, creed, disability, gender and 
ethnicity”.
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Postkoloniale Gouvernementalität und „die Politik der 
Vergewaltigung“: Gewalt, Verletzlichkeit und der Staat
NIKITA DHAWAN1
In regelmäßigen Abständen finden sich auf den Straßen Indiens Protestierende in 
großer Anzahl zusammen, um ihren Groll über eine Vielzahl an Problemen auszu-
drücken, die von Korruption bis zu Stromausfällen, vom Preisanstieg der Zwiebeln 
bis hin zur US-Außenpolitik reichen. Protestversammlungen kommen recht häufig 
vor und werden von Demonstrationen, Aktionen des zivilen Ungehorsams, Hunger-
streiks und der Verbrennung von Symbolen begleitet. Die indische Mittelschicht ist 
jedoch eher bekannt für ihre politische Teilnahmslosigkeit und ihrer Ablehnung von 
Straßenpolitik, weswegen sich die Teilnahme an diesen Versammlungen größtenteils 
auf AktivistInnen und Personen aus marginalisierten Gruppen wie der Arbeiterklasse, 
religiösen Minderheiten, Dalits2 und Tribals (indigene Gruppen) beschränkt. Dies 
ist oftmals auch in Bezug auf feministische Anliegen der Fall, obwohl geschlechts-
spezifische Gewalt (wie Mitgiftmorde, Ehrenmorde, Abtreibung, Kinderheirat und 
Vergewaltigung in der Ehe) Frauen über Kasten, Klassen, Religionen und über die 
Stadt-Land-Gegensatz hinweg betreffen. Trotz einer lebendigen Frauenbewegung 
und einer starken Zivilgesellschaft mit einflussreichen NGOs sind an feministischen 
Kampagnen gegen geschlechtsspezifische Gewalt und wirtschaftliche Ungerech-
tigkeit, welche versuchen, ein Bewusstsein für die verfassungsmäßigen Rechte von 
Frauen zu schaffen und den Staat unter Druck setzen, um Gesetze zu reformieren, nur 
wenige Frauen aus dem Mittelstand und aus höheren Kasten beteiligt. Die jüngsten 
Anti-Vergewaltigungsproteste in Indien, die als Reaktion auf die Gruppenvergewalti-
gung und den grauenhaften Angriff auf eine junge Studentin im Dezember 2012 in der 
Hauptstadt des Landes stattfanden, waren daher eine Ausnahme in jeglicher Hinsicht.
Die beispiellosen landesweiten Demonstrationen, an denen ein breites Spektrum 
der indischen Bevölkerung – von jungen AkademikerInnen bis zu Hausfrauen teil-
nahmen – bestätigen Lauren Berlants (2009) These, öffentliche Sphären seien Af-
fektwelten, in denen öffentliche Wut, Empörung und Frustration einen deliberativen 
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